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This article argues for the importance of Soviet forecasting and scientific 
future studies in shaping Soviet governmentalities in the post-Stalinist pe-
riod.1 The de-Stalinization of Soviet governance not only involved the aboli-
tion of Iosif Stalin's personality cult but also led to wider intellectual changes 
in conceptions of the nature, possibilities, and tasks of governance. Some of 
these changes, such as the impact of cybernetics after its rehabilitation in 
1956, have been explored by historians of science and technology.2 However, 
although cybernetic control is based on prediction and therefore principally 
oriented toward the future, a new branch of scientific governance, scientific 
forecasting, has been overlooked, despite its transformative role as an applied 
policy science. Scientific forecasting sought to generate knowledge about the 
future states of the Soviet economy and society, becoming a field of reform, in-
novation, and power struggle, one that needs to be rediscovered by scholars.3 
This article lays the groundwork for such rediscovery, outlining a brief history 
of Soviet scientific forecasting and drawing out its relation to east-west intel-
lectual and governmental interaction. 
The introduction of scientific forecasting into Soviet governance was 
highly significant because its effects were quite ambivalent. Forecasting was 
intended to give planners more control over the future of the economy and 
society. However, the methodological principles of forecasting were incom-
patible with many features of the Soviet governmental apparatus, in particu-
lar state secrecy and the compartmentalization of data. As early as the mid-
1960s, Soviet economic planners called for more transparency (glasnost) and, 
indeed, horizontal democracy, because these were understood as absolutely 
necessary for the new, scientific Soviet governmentality. In this way, the his-
This study was part of the research project "A Political History of the Future : Knowledge 
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tory of Soviet scientific forecasting is also the history of the developments that 
connected de-Stalinization to perestroika. 
The focus on scientific forecasting is also important because it offers a 
new case for studies of the Soviet system's opening up to the west: the de-
velopment of scientific forecasting was anchored in international networks 
of scientists, policymakers, and activists.4 According to Hunter Heyck, 1956 
proved to be an annus mirabilis for the development of new ideas about gov-
ernability and control in the United States. Around this date, a whole array of 
foundational texts were published declaring the birth of new policy sciences, 
such as decision analysis, operations research, and systems analysis.5 These 
new fields were components of a particular future-oriented governmentality 
that built on a specific understanding of modernization as a universal pro-
cess driven by the U.S. vision of technoscientific progress.6 But these policy 
sciences also alerted governments to rapidly emerging technical and social 
changes, thus creating the need for richer, more reliable anticipatory knowl-
edge. The western world that Nikita Khrushchev sought "to catch up to and 
surpass" imposed a requirement on the Soviets to change and embrace a new 
way of thinking about the knowability of both nature and society and the uses 
of this knowledge for governmental purposes.7 To live up to its self-proclaimed 
status as an advanced country, the Soviet Union bought into this new world of 
advanced methods and problems. 
Scientific forecasting, to be sure, is one of many innovative scientific ap-
proaches belonging to the hybrid field of future studies, which took shape dur-
ing the 1950s and boomed in the 1960s.8 The approaches diverged, as scholars 
were guided by quite contrasting visions as to the role of scientific expertise 
4. Jenny Andersson, "The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World," Ameri-
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vanie, designates different future studies methods, some of which capitalized on math-
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and qualitative approaches. In this article, I treat forecasting and scientific future stud-
ies as synonymous. For an accessible overview of different approaches in future studies, 
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in government. If the Austrian writer Robert Jungk promoted future studies 
as a democratic process from below, the U.S. scientist Herman Kahn sought to 
influence high politics with his cost-benefit scenarios of the world future in On 
Thermonuclear War (1960). Indeed, in the United States, much future studies 
work came from the military-industrial complex, most notably the RAND Cor-
poration, where Kahn began his career. At RAND, Olaf Helmer and his team 
developed the Delphi method, an influential technique of anonymous expert 
surveying conducted over several rounds to bring specialists' views close to 
consensus, first publicized in 1964. Large-scale planning was another area 
in which scientific examination of the future was developed and promoted 
by international organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), for which the prominent representative 
of technoscientific forecasting Erich Jantsch conceptualized explorative and 
normative forecasting techniques in 1967. 
The 1960s boom in future studies increased awareness that more knowl-
edge about the future produced more uncertainty. Even the scientific forecast-
ers, representing the most quantitative branch of future studies, admitted that 
their method was able to produce alternative paths of development only for 
narrow sectors and short-term periods; for example, a reliable demographic 
forecast of a given state's population could be made for the next thirty years, 
but only if the factor of migration was excluded. The introduction of more 
complexity would make any future, even a communist one, essentially uncer-
tain in the long term and, in consequence, knowable and governable only to a 
limited extent. How could this approach, apparently so disruptive with regard 
to what was described by James Scott as the Soviet high modernist ambition 
to rationally plan and control the development of both society and nature, be 
adopted and used in the Soviet Union? 
In this article, I examine these questions through two cases central to the 
history of Soviet forecasting: the debates about long-term economic planning 
in the 1960s, and the emergence of social forecasting. I argue that due to its 
postpositivist epistemology, but also its close relation to the strategically im-
portant computer technologies, scientific forecasting was particularly condu-
cive to criticism of Soviet economic planning. Scientific forecasting enabled 
some actors to reform (at least intellectually) Soviet governance: a demand 
for glasnost in the circulation of data was posed as a necessary condition for 
producing valid forecasts as early as the 1960s.9 Other actors assumed a more 
complacent approach, seeing the scientific forecasting of society as a tool of 
surveillance and a shortcut to a political career. I argue that, whether reforma-
tive or complacent, Soviet forecasting incrementally undermined the ambi-
tion for total, centralized control. 
Due to space limitations, this article will briefly introduce the interwar ex-
periments in the development of future studies for the purposes of communist 
see Tuomo Kuosa, The Evolution of Strategic Foresight: Navigating Public Policy Making 
(Farnham, 2012). 
9. Note that the word glasnost was also used by the KGB in the late 1950s to reha-
bilitate its status. Julie Elkner, "The Changing Face of Repression under Khrushchev," 
in Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith, eds., Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev 
(London, 2009), 149. 
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governance, before situating post-World War II future studies as a component 
of cybernetic governmentality. This will be followed by a longer discussion of 
debates about forecasting as a tool to improve economic planning conducted 
at the State Planning Institute (Gosplan) in 1966.10 These debates were of cen-
tral importance because they set a formula according to which scientific stud-
ies of the future of Soviet society were subordinated to economic planning 
goals. The article's last section will provide a critical perspective on the con-
tribution of Igor' Bestuzhev-Lada, a Russian scholar who is described in the 
internal historiography of future studies as the key, pioneering promoter of 
social forecasting in the Soviet Union. However, Bestuzhev-Lada remains un-
known in the histories of Soviet science, even sociology, although he worked 
at the prominent Institute for Concrete Social Research, which has attracted 
a lot of historians' attention because of its dramatic fate: the institute sought 
to rejuvenate Soviet social studies with western sociological theories and as a 
result was purged and placed under tight ideological control. Bestuzhev-Lada 
nevertheless looked beyond sociology. Outlining his efforts to dominate the 
field of social forecasting, I demonstrate how the struggle for the Soviet future 
turned into a struggle for Soviet future studies. 
Knowing and Controlling the Future in Postrevolutionary Russia 
Soviet forecasting evolved in close proximity to planning, and their histories 
are closely intertwined. In Russian historiography, the roots of Soviet fore-
casting are traced back to the idea of the State Commission for Electrification 
of Russia (GOELRO) to develop a fifteen-year state plan for the development of 
electrical infrastructure, launched in 1920. GOELRO planners and engineers 
became aware that the electricity grid's costly and large-scale infrastructure 
could not be developed without precise knowledge of the types and locations 
of the future industries to be served by it. Furthermore, as the plan's imple-
mentation extended at least fifteen years, the planning had to anticipate fu-
ture technology changes.11 
The GOELRO project led to the institutionalization of centralized national 
planning in Soviet Russia and the establishment of a central planning com-
mission (Gosplan), where the first methodological thinking about the future 
was articulated by the urban planner Vladimir (Rudnev) Bazarov. A childhood 
friend of the pioneering systems theorist Aleksandr (Malinovskii) Bogdanov, 
Bazarov was involved in the writing of the first perspective plan {perspektyv-
nyiplari), in 1921-29. Convinced that technoscientific development was a con-
tinuous process, which could not be wholly determined beforehand, Bazarov 
published articles claiming that Soviet plans should never specify the means 
10. The most influential institutes were those of the Ail-Union Academy of Sciences, 
Gosplan, and the State Committee for Science and Technology under the Council of Min-
isters. The Central Institute for Mathematical Economics calculated economic and de-
mographic forecasts, the academy's Computer Center did forecasts on oil and gas pro-
curement and environmental and climate change, labor markets were forecasted by the 
Institute of International Labor Movement, and the lifestyle and the attitudes of youth 
were explored at the Institute for Concrete Social Research. 
11. Collier, Post-Soviet Social. 
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and ends in minute detail. Instead, the plans should be open-ended "plans-
prognoses." Indicating that policy measures would be adjusted as the need 
arose, this approach stated the necessity of an open and flexible framework 
to govern the future.12 
A deep, epistemological question remained, however: could the future be 
known scientifically? The answer was formulated in the adjacent milieu of 
the nascent management science (nauchnaia organizatsiia truda, NOT) in the 
1910s-20s. One of the first systematic Russian thinkers about the manage-
ment of the future was the French-educated Valer'ian Murav'ev, a research 
secretary at the Central Institute for Labor, founded by Aleksei Gastev in Mos-
cow in 1920.13 Murav'ev's essay "The Mastery of Time as the Key Task in the 
Organization of Work" (1924) elaborated on the Einsteinian notion of time. For 
Murav'ev, if time were understood as an expression of the relations between 
things, it would be possible to know the future by studying these abstracted 
sequences of material relations. To know the future is to accumulate knowl-
edge about possible configurations of things and their relations and then to 
sequence these configurations—an immense task, but possible from an epis-
temological point of view.14 In a similar way, the knowability of the future was 
postulated in terms of a theory of developmental cycles, most famously the 
economist Nikolai Kondrat'ev's idea of long economic waves.15 
The future was defined as consisting of both material and social com-
ponents—technical structures, people, and behavior. An important addition 
here was behaviorist time control, developed in Russian time and motion 
studies. Gastev, together with Platon Kerzhentsev, a journalist and member 
of the communist government, founded the League of Time, which sought to 
"systematize time" via planning, in 1923, aiming to transform the backward 
practices of Soviet industries and administration by introducing precision: 
"Instead of 'maybe'—an exact calculation; instead of 'in some way'—a well-
thought-through plan; instead of 'somehow'—a scientific method; instead of 
'in some time'—at 20 hours 35 minutes on the 15th of October."16 Once future 
configurations were sequenced, they could be controlled, and controlled pre-
cisely. Many more examples could be called in to support my case, but the 
point is that the fundamental set of approaches to temporality in relation to 
governance emerged in postrevolutionary Russia: the need for flexible plan-
ning based on forecasting (at that time a linear statistical extrapolation), a 
contention that governed objects, be they human bodies, firms, or large-scale 
technical systems, were fundamentally knowable. No less important was the 
postulate that no efficient organizing was possible without exact and empiri-
cal scientific knowledge. 
In retrospect, these innovative efforts were severely limited in their appli-
12. V. S. Klebaner, "V. A. Bazarov: Myslitel', uchenyi, grazhdanin," Problemyprogno-
zirovaniia 6 (2004): 153-54. 
13.1 thank Oleg Genisaretskii for drawing my attention to Murav'ev. 
14. V. N. Murav'ev, Ovladenie vremenem kak osnovnaia zadacha truda (Moscow, 
1924). 
15. N. D. Kondrat'ev, Bol'shie tsikly kori'iunktury i teoriia predvideniia (Moscow, 1924-
28; 2002). 
16. P. M. Kerzhentsev, Printsipy organizatsii (Moscow, 1921; 1968), 376. 
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cation and literally short-lived. Soviet planning processes, as detailed by Peter 
Rutland and then Paul Gregory, remained hopelessly confused, and only five-
year plans provided some general guidelines, albeit in a highly aggregated 
manner.17 Soviet workers remained unskilled and their living conditions were 
often worse than before the revolution.18 Soviet management scientists lacked 
basic equipment to conduct their experiments or to train managers.19 That 
many time-motion studies could not be empirically conducted for a lack of 
stopwatches was one of the lesser concerns: the changing political climate 
would soon claim the very lives of the scientific time managers. Gosplan 
was purged in 1937. Murav'ev was sentenced to death on political grounds 
but died from disease before the execution. Kondrat'ev, Gastev, Kerzhentsev, 
and Bazarov were executed in 1938-40. Access to their work was forbidden 
to both the public and specialists. Gastev's and Kerzhentsev's work would be 
republished in the mid-1960s, but Murav'ev's and Bazarov's would become 
available in Russian only in the 1990s. Therefore, the post-Stalinist predic-
tive policy sciences—in particular, technology assessment—developed in dia-
logue with American and western European scholarship rather than within 
its own, Russian tradition. A fundamental role in opening up a space for this 
dialogue was played by cybernetics. 
Cybernetic Governmentality of the Soviet Future 
Scientific forecasting, based on statistical time series and used to identify 
probabilistic future states of a given process, was part of what I call a cy-
bernetic governmentality.20 In line with Michel Foucault, I use the concept 
governmentality to emphasize that state governance should not be reduced 
to law, formal bureaucracy, and the exercise of power through the external 
imposition of force. The exercise of governmental power can also be traced in 
the different intellectual and material techniques of ordering human behavior 
or the environment.21 After the war, cybernetics became a significant source 
of such governmental techniques. Developed by the American mathemati-
cian Norbert Wiener during WWII and widely disseminated beginning in the 
1940s, cybernetics, a science of communication and control, was first banned 
17. Peter Rutland, The Myth of the Plan: Lessons of Soviet Planning Experience (Lon-
don, 1985). Gregory suggests that the Soviet economy was in fact guided by shorter-term 
operational plans. According to him, five-year plans were only "propaganda instruments," 
used to focus "the population on the bright future." He does not, however, discuss the role 
of longer-term, fifteen- to twenty-year plans. Paul Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalin-
ism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives (Cambridge, Eng., 2004), 118-20,124. 
18. Loren Graham, The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the 
Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass., 1996). 
19. Daniel A. Wren, "Scientific Management in the U.S.S.R., with Particular Reference 
to the Contribution of Walter N. Polakov," Academy of Management Review 5, no. 1 (Janu-
ary 1980): 1-11. 
20.1 developed the concept of system-cybernetic governmentality in Rindzeviciute, 
The Power of Systems. 
21. For the classic discussion of the Foucauldian approach to governmentality, see 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality (Chicago, 1991). 
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in 1948 then rehabilitated in the Soviet Union in 1956, eventually being de-
clared the science of governance. In the Soviet Union, cybernetics stimulated 
the invention of cyberspeak, a policy jargon of advanced socialism, but it also 
transformed Soviet governance by giving it a new orientation to the future.22 
Goal-oriented cybernetic control linked the past, present, and future through 
feedback loops of free-flowing information, a process that was a world apart 
from dictatorial goal-setting. 
A mechanical universe was replaced with a cybernetic one. The metaphor 
of workers as cogs in the machine was replaced by one of people as carriers 
and conductors of information in Soviet governmental discourses.23 Signifi-
cantly, the cybernetic notion of "teleological" or purpose-guided behavior 
rejected Newtonian mechanical causality, because cybernetics referred to an 
activity that was determined not by past causes but by future goals and regu-
lated through real-time feedback loops.24 Alongside cybernetics, the systems 
approach postulated complexity and interconnectivity: no single actor, be it 
human or machine, could be appropriately controlled without taking into ac-
count its multiple links.25 We need to pause here to stress that Wiener's idea of 
teleology should not be confused with the Soviet concept tselevoe planirova-
nie, created in the 1920s and translated in English as "teleological planning," 
because these are two different approaches that invoke different types of gov-
ernmentality. According to Stephen Collier, tselevoe planirovanie put a pre-
mium on the plan's internal consistency, preferably expressed numerically, 
and thus promised the illusion of total control over planning instruments and 
targets.26 Therefore, tselevoe planirovanie had none of the flexibility of a real-
time feedback system as conceptualized by Wiener, designed to respond to 
the ever-changing environment in order to stay on course. 
Furthermore, the intellectualization of control was accompanied by intel-
lectualized work enabled by advances in computer technology. Left-leaning 
western thinkers warned that automation threatened to make manual labor 
redundant and to completely transform class-based politics and society.27 
In the 1950s, a group of liberal intellectuals associated with the Congress of 
Cultural Freedom formulated a vision of a new, postindustrial society based 
on an economy driven by services and information.28 By the mid-1950s, the 
22. Gerovitch, From Newspeak. 
23. Arkhiv Rossiiskoi akademii nauk (ARAN), f. 1977, op. 2, d. 5,1.2. 
24. Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose and 
Teleology," Philosophy of Science 10, no. 1 (January 1943): 18-24. 
25. Agathe C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes, eds., Systems, Experts, and Comput-
ers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2000). 
26. Collier, Post-Soviet Social, 62-64. 
27. David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation 
(Oxford, 1986). 
28. Funded by the CIA, the congress contributed to the discrediting of the leftist move-
ment in the west. However, this did not entirely obstruct the spread of the participants' 
ideas, such as the idea of a new service and knowledge-production-driven economy by 
one of the founders of management as an intellectual field, Peter Drucker, in his The Land-
marks of Tomorrow (New York, 1959). In the Soviet context, much more controversial were 
the ideas articulated by David Bell in his The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion ofPoliti-
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theory of the scientific-technical revolution (STR) had emerged, according to 
which technoscience drove both economic growth and social change, lead-
ing to major transformations in both state socialist and capitalist societies.29 
The Soviets adopted a particular version of the STR articulated by the leftist 
British scientist and public intellectual John Desmond Bernal back in 1939.30 
One of the underlying reasons for introducing the STR into the Marxist-Lenin-
ist version of development was its emphasis on universalism and "peaceful 
struggle in economics," which was expected to facilitate east-west technology 
transfer.31 
Underscoring the fundamental importance of prediction in controlling 
complex, goal-oriented processes, this cybernetic governmentality bred new 
approaches and techniques for extracting knowledge about the future. Obvi-
ously, in the Soviet Union, these ideas were subject to careful political censor-
ship. For instance, the western term futurology, coined by the German scholar 
Ossip Flechtheim in 1943, was not well received; the theory was derided as 
a bourgeois science, although unlike cybernetics and genetics, it was never 
completely rejected. Indeed, Flechtheim's call to liberate the future, be it state 
socialist or capitalist, from technocrats could hardly appeal to the Soviets. Be-
ing similarly skeptical about the plural futures studies, the Soviets preferred 
prognozirovanie, translated into English as "forecasting." Yet western future 
studies based on quantitative methods were borrowed in piecemeal fashion, 
making them correspond crudely with dialectic materialism. For instance, in 
1969, two influential scientists from the military-industrial complex and pro-
moters of information theory, Germogen Pospelov and Vitalii Maksimenko, 
pointed out that "the best-known method in our country" was the Delphi 
method, adding that although it was created at RAND, the method could only 
be useful in a state socialist regime.32 These ideological quibbles, however, 
did little more than disguise the power of scientific forecasting, which was 
both the medium and the message. 
cal Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe, 1960) and The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture 
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in the Age of Cold War," Minerva 50, no. 3 (September 2012): 307-37. 
29. Margaret J. Osier, Rethinking the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, Eng., 2000). 
30. "Sotsial'nye posledstviia nauchno-tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii i sovetskii rabochii 
klass," ARAN, f. 1977, op. 2, d. 5, 1. 1. Bernal's Science in History (1954) was published 
in Russian as Nauka v istorii obshchestva (Moscow, 1956). For more on Bernal and the 
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31. "NTR i problemy klassovoi bor'by" (1969), ARAN, f. 1957, op. 1, d. 62,11. 44-45. 
32. The term Delphi method was originally created by Abraham Kaplan in 1950, and 
the method was developed by Olaf Helmer, Norman Dalkey, and T. J. Gordon at RAND. On 
Soviet adaptation of the Delphi method, see G. S. Pospelov and V. I. Maksimenko, "Pre-
dislovie," in I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada and R. A. Fesenko, Gorizonty nauki i tekhniki (Moscow, 
1969), 8-9; and Jenny Andersson, "Forging the American Future: RAND, the Commission 
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Forecasting in Service of Centralized Planning? 
After Stalin's death, Soviet planners turned their attention back to the western 
experience of economic governance. During postwar reconstruction, but even 
more so in response to the Soviet economy's slowing growth, which became 
evident by the late 1950s, Gosplan grew and professionalized.33 An important 
innovation was the 1955 establishment of the Scientific Research Institute of 
Economics (NIEI), dedicated to macroeconomic problems and the develop-
ment of normative conceptual foundations for perspective planning.3'1 One 
of NIEI's tasks was to learn from similar governmental bodies in the west. In 
November 1958, NIEI director and prominent economist Anatolii Efimov, to-
gether with six colleagues, embarked on a two-week trip to France. There was 
a good reason for that: the French government put a premium on large-scale 
and rather centralized planning, and, under Pierre Masse, as commissaire 
general du Plan, new methods of planning based on long-term forecasting 
were developed. Thus, in addition to factory visits, Soviet economists learned 
about political economist Jean Monnet's plans and the work of the commissar-
iat. Back in Moscow, Efimov wrote in his report that French "planning organs 
naturally need to satisfy themselves with merely making a kind of 'program-
prognosis,' which is made on the most general level and does not command 
anyone. It is in this sense that the term 'planning' is used in relation to the 
French economy." Having labelled this kind of planning "indicative," Efimov 
continued: "It is clear that under the indicative system of planning, even the 
most perfect method of making the branches of the economy proportionate 
cannot guarantee a lawful development of economics."35 This encounter with 
French practices of central planning was crucial because it contributed to 
the establishment of a particular notion of forecasting in the Soviet Union. 
Forecasting was understood as "failed planning," a compromise and a tool 
that a weak state planning agency used to coordinate a free market economy, 
designed to compensate for the absence of central directive-based planning. 
Accordingly, forecasting was deemed unnecessary in directive-led Soviet eco-
nomic planning. 
And indeed, long-term plans could be and were made without forecasting. 
The first long-term plan (for fifteen years) was made by Gosplan just before the 
Nazi invasion in 1941. In the late 1950s, Gosplan produced a twenty-year plan 
called "a general perspective" for the period 1961-80.36 Both plans claimed to 
be based on interbranch balances, which in fact could be classified as a type 
33. Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism. 
34. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE), f. 99, op. 1,11.1-4. From 
1960 to 1964, NIEI was under the State Economic Council. 
35. "Otchet" (November 1958), RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 858,11.5-6. 
36. A1957 scheme for continuous planning included general perspective plans (for fif-
teen to twenty years), five-year plans, and annual plans. RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 862,11.21-22. 
A French planner noted that Gosplan's perspective planning was based on calculations 
of optimal development of existing trends. French prospective planning indicated sev-
eral quite different futures and was "not thinkable" for Soviet economists. Robert Fraisse, 
"Notes sur planification a long terme en Union Sovietique" (December 1966), BR 4/513/8, 
Sciences Po, 11. 
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of forecasting, as it enabled modeling future configurations of the economy. 
The 1941 plan was, however, merely a conceptual exercise, because there was 
not a sufficiently developed mathematical method for calculating such a bal-
ance. The 1950s plan was no better. The talented economist Emil' Ershov, who 
would leave later NIEI to become the director of the Central Institute of Mathe-
matical Economics (TsEMI), recalled a complete absence of any methodologi-
cal literature when he was asked to develop the interbranch balances in the 
late 1950s.37 The calculations done for the 1961-80 plan were criticized by 
both westerners, most famously Wassily Leontief, and Soviet economists.38 
However, predictive methods were necessary for any complex automated 
systems and, just like cybernetics, which was publicly banned between 1948 
and 1955, were developed secretly in the military-industrial complex. In turn, 
scientific forecasting was first formulated as part of the process of military-
technology assessment and defense strategy: in the 1940s-50s, complex 
statistical series extrapolation methods, as well as other methods of deci-
sion sciences, were most certainly developed at Soviet military-research in-
stitutions.39 Soviet publications on forecasting in research and development 
also preceded the ones in economic planning. For instance, in 1964, Voprosy 
filosofii (The Issues of Philosophy) published the first article about forecast-
ing methods in organizing scientific research, authored by Genadii Dobrov, a 
Ukrainian scientist who participated in pioneering projects for the develop-
ment of computers in Kyiv and later established himself as the leading author-
ity on research policy.40 Memoirs also hint that the spread of forecasting in the 
Soviet Union resembled that in the United States, where the military control 
techniques developed at RAND were extended to the civil sector, although 
Russian historiography remains opaque about this.41 
It was the introduction of a new large-scale technical project that pro-
pelled scientific forecasting in Soviet economic planning forward in the late 
1950s, just like it did in the 1920s. The breakthrough came when the Soviet 
government decided to develop Siberian oil and gas fields and build a pipeline 
to Europe, a project that equaled GOELRO in significance. As a vice chairman 
of the Council of Ministers and then chairman from 1964, Aleksei Kosygin 
personally supported this project and was aware that the new technological 
structure required a longer-term outlook. He was also receptive to the ideas 
of the prominent Russian computer scientists Germogen Pospelov and Viktor 
37. Grigorii Sapov, "Tri interv'iu s E. B. Ershovym. Pervoe interv'iu" (February-March 
1999), at www.sapov.ru/staroe/si06.html (last accessed December 5,2015). 
38. "Stenograma" (Moscow, December 14,1966), RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869; Bernard 
Rosier, ed., Wassily Leontief: Textes et itineraire (Paris, 1986). 
39.1 base this statement on the memoir by N. N. Moiseev, Kak daleko do zavtreshnego 
dnia...: Svobodnye razmyshleniia, 1917-1993 (Moscow, 1997). 
40. Iu. V. Ershov and A. S. Popovich, "Propushchennaia vozmozhnost' obognat' 
Ameriku, ili k chemu provodit ignorirovanie prognoz," Top Club Journal 3, no. 21 (2012): 
8-17; Genadii Dobrov, "0 predvidenii razvitiia nauki," Voprosy filosofii, no. 10 (1964): 
71-82. 
41. See N. N. Moiseev, Kak daleko; Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armagedon (Stan-
ford, 1991); and Joy Rohde, Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social 
Research during the Cold War (Ithaca, 2013). 
62 Slavic Review 
Glushkov, who offered to computerize planning and reorient it to incorporate 
different methods of forecasting.42 Furthermore, Kosygin worked in tandem 
with his son-in-law, Dzhermen Gvishiani, an influential westernizer of So-
viet management and mediator of many large east-west trade deals. The 1920s 
Soviet version of Taylorism was revived and upgraded by Gvishiani, who in 
1963 authoritatively announced that "governance was first and foremost a 
science," claiming that both personal experience and a narrow specializa-
tion in engineering were "totally insufficient" in the context of the increas-
ingly complex role of governance and calling for extensive retraining of Soviet 
managers.43 Once Khrushchev was ousted, in 1964, and Kosygin climbed up 
the political hierarchy to become second only to Leonid Brezhnev, the future 
of Soviet scientific future studies was sealed. Planning was to be optimal, 
scientific, and based on a wide array of short- and long-term predictions.44 
In his 1965 speech at Gosplan, Kosygin proclaimed that scientific forecasting 
was the key component of planning, because "planning is a science." Gos-
plan should from then on supply the republics' governments and companies 
with scientific forecasts, to be revised in light of local context and sent back 
to the central planners.45 Kosygin's notion of forecasting's role in planning 
would remain set for the next twenty-five years: "Discussions of scientific 
forecasts need to precede the development of plans for the branches of the 
national economy.... We need to forecast scientifically the development of 
every branch of industry to be able to give way in time to the most advanced 
and progressive developments."46 From 1965, both Gosplan and the Academy 
of Sciences institutes began to develop long-term forecasts for economic de-
velopment.47 In December 1966, the first open academic meeting dedicated to 
the conceptual development of long-term planning on the basis of forecasting 
was organized in Moscow.48 Arranged at NIEI, this meeting was stormed by 
enthusiastic crowds of scholars. According to Efimov, the novelty and impor-
tance of scientific future studies was "illustrated by the energy with which 
many comrades attempted to enter this hall. Such Anschlag is normally seen 
only in grand theater premiers. This is understandable, because the question 
of long-term prognosis is so exciting for us."49 Although about 250 participants 
registered to attend a session on forecasting the national economy, more than 
450 showed up; another session on mathematical forecasting was attended by 
42. Dmitry Travin and Otar Marganiya, "Resource Curse: Rethinking the Soviet Ex-
perience," in Vladimir Gel'man and Otar Marganiya, eds., Resource Curse and Post-Soviet 
Eurasia: Oil, Gas and Modernization (Lanham, 2010), 31-32; D. V. Efremenko, Vvedenie v 
otsenku tekhniki (Moscow, 2002), 59. 
43. Dzhermen Gvishiani, "Upravlenie—prezhde vsego nauka," Izvestiia, no. 118 
(May 19,1963): 2. 
44. On Kosygin, see Aappo Kahonen, "Optimal Planning, Optimal Economy, Optimal 
Life? The Kosygin Reforms, 1965-72," in Katalin Miklossy and Melanie Ilic, eds., Competi-
tion in Socialist Society (London, 2014), 23-40. 
45. Aleksei Kosygin, "Povyshenie nauchnoi obosnovannosti planov—vazhneishaia 
zadacha planovykh organov," Planovoe khoziaistvo, no. 4 (April 1965): 4. 
46. Ibid., 4-5. 
47. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 65,1.3; RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869,1. 3. 
48. "Stenograma," 1.115. 
49. RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869,1.15. 
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100 persons.50 The obligatory propaganda dues were paid to the superiority of 
the Soviet system: the Soviet Union was called "the motherland of planning," 
and the Gosplan veteran Shamai Turetskii claimed that French planners bor-
rowed the "very essence of forecasting" from Russia.51 The contention that 
GOELRO was the root of scientific forecasting was cemented and the speak-
ers invoked the importance of cross-branch forecasting to estimate the future 
demand for energy many times. The interwar tradition was invoked in the 
plenary session of this meeting: Gosplan economists referred to the 1920s' 
achievements in Soviet long-term planning and the debates about the long-
term prognoses as if self-evident and well known to all, although the names of 
Bazarov and Gastev were not mentioned in the verbatim transcripts.52 All this 
was probably both ideological and pragmatic. Having established the Soviet 
forecasting tradition's precedence, it was possible to claim that the govern-
ment could and should learn from the capitalist experience.53 
The archival records of these discussions show that Soviet economists 
hoped to use this official orientation to promote forecasting as a tool to change 
ad hoc and nonsystematic Soviet planning in practice. Kosygin himself com-
plained that far too many held the "primitive view" that Gosplan's role was 
not so much to develop all-union targets but to mechanically glue together 
the plans using separate proposals from republics.54 In this context, the use of 
forecasting was expected to simultaneously discipline and expand the intel-
lectual scope of Gosplan.55 The meeting discarded the earlier idea of forecast-
ing as failed state planning. If Gvishiani proclaimed that governance was, 
first, a science, a young economist, Boris Breev, insisted that "governance 
is not possible without prognosis."56 In his lengthy talk, Abel Aganbegian, 
who was then in his mid-30s and later rose to become an economic advisor 
to Mikhail Gorbachev, pronounced that prognoses were not "a step back from 
planning," a possible interpretation of Kosygin's formula of forecasting as a 
stage of preplanning, but "a move deeper."57 
The reformative effect of scientific forecasting was also noted: forecasts 
explore several alternative directions of development, thus implying that the 
Soviet future was open to different trajectories.58 To this, Leonid Kantoro-
vich, the prominent economist and creator of linear planning's input-output 
methodology, added that the plans should be understood as probabilistic, not 
deterministic. The economy, he argued, "could not be expected to develop 
according to the plan," and hence multiple possibilities need always be con-
sidered.59 This "realistic" view was shared by many leading mathematical 
50. Ibid., 11. 97-105. 
51. Ibid., 11.43-46, 52. 
52. Ibid., 1. 27. 
53. Ibid., 1.13. 
54. Kosygin, "Povyshenie," 4. 
55. RGAE, f. 99, op. 2, op. 1. 
56. "Stenograma," 1.17. 
57. Ibid., 11.32-33. 
58. This was a modest pluralism referring to different routes leading to different 
levels of achievement, such as maximum, minimum, and average. RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, 
d. 869,11.7-9. 
59. Ibid., 11. 64-68. 
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economists. Ershov, for example, recalled thinking that it would have been 
the utmost nonsense to expect the five-year plans to be implemented; how-
ever, it is important to note that such views could only be voiced in closed, 
academic discussions and not in public.60 
The emphasis on glasnost was perhaps the most striking aspect of these 
discussions in 1966. An economist argued that the existing forecasts for sepa-
rate branches, such as carbon fuels, were simply absurd and incorrect, because 
future development of a particular sector was extrapolated without regard to 
the changes happening in related sectors. To be able to forecast meant shar-
ing the data horizontally across academic and governmental organizations. 
Furthermore, the methodology of forecasting, it was argued, demanded that 
Soviet planners openly face some inconvenient facts: Breev insisted that the 
current practice of grounding the plans exclusively on "achievements" was 
gravely misleading. Calling for an "analytical history of national economic 
planning," he added, somewhat realistically, that this requirement was not 
expected "to be fulfilled soon."61 
The NIEI economists' calls for glasnost did not stop at the data issue. The 
1966 meeting went as far as to insist on public discussion of forecasts. To be 
sure, no one meant involving the general public in the discussions; by pub-
lic, they were referring to academic experts, thus placing the Soviet future in 
their preserve.62 Gosplan economists frankly asserted that forecasting did not 
challenge the existing power concentration because it was limited to a "small 
circle of specialists" at the top of government.63 Nevertheless, this suggestion, 
albeit clearly elitist, was an important step in questioning the Politburo's mo-
nopoly on information.64 Looking back, it is quite clear that these arguments 
alone did not translate into action; they did not lead to breaking up the strictly 
centralized, supervised, and compartmentalized data flows within Gosplan. 
Although the Academy of Sciences and branch institutes were ordered to de-
velop forecasts pertaining to their respective sectors, they had virtually no ac-
cess to the data pertaining to other, crucially relevant sectors. The result was 
methodologically flawed branch studies. Even the most technical and narrow 
forecasting required a much higher degree of open information flow than the 
Soviet system was prepared to allow for. In practice, Gosplan remained a me-
dieval fiefdom in which branch decisions continued to be made without any 
regard to cross-branch effects.65 
Nevertheless, I suggest that the legitimation and prioritization of scien-
tific forecasting had a domino effect that brought about further changes in 
Soviet governmentality. One of the reasons was a particular view of the STR, 
which required the revision of Marxist-Leninist dogmas to accommodate the 
view that science and technology were no longer a superstructure but a di-
rect driver of social transformation. Society was therefore incorporated into 
60. Sapov, "Tri interv'iu." 
61. "Stenograma," (Moscow, December 14,1966), RGAE, f.99, op.l, d.869,11.16-23. 
62. Ibid., 1.26. 
63. Ibid, 1.2. 
64. ARAN, f. 2, op. 1, d. 858,1.176. 
65. On clientelism in Soviet policymaking, see Stephen Fortescue, ed., Russian Poli-
tics: From Lenin to Putin (Basingstoke, 2010); ARAN, f.2, op.l, d.858,11.172-173. 
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the range of things whose future had to be scientifically examined to ensure 
effective development of large-scale projects, such as oil and gas fields and 
computer technologies. Enter social forecasting, a branch of applied sociology 
that served as both a gate and a bottleneck for Soviet future studies. 
Soviet Future Studies, the Bestuzhev-Lada Way 
Soviet sociology was fully rehabilitated at about the same time that forecast-
ing was publicly acknowledged as the key methodology of the planning pro-
cess: the Soviet Association of Sociology was formally recognized in 1966. The 
history of the first Soviet sociological institution, the Institute for Concrete 
Social Research (IKSI), established in Moscow in 1968, reveals the importance 
of prediction in the painstaking search for sure footing on the shaky grounds 
of communist social science.66 Social forecasting would later be described as 
"the most advanced form of governing social relations and processes, which 
makes it possible to scientifically predict and solve social problems."67 The 
problems of Soviet society, in other words, could be anticipated and prevented, 
but this emphasis on governability and control was explicitly contrasted with 
the epistemology of forecasting, according to which societal development was 
probabilistic. If society was governed by random chance, one had to acknowl-
edge that at least some of the aspects of Soviet society's future were beyond 
knowledge and control.68 It was this gray zone between the promise of control 
and the postulation of uncertainty that was used by scholars wishing to es-
cape the strait jacket of Marxist-Leninist development theory. 
To be sure, this subversive effect of social forecasting was explicitly ad-
dressed and measures were taken to rein it in by specifying the institutional 
subordination and areas of application: first, the priority of party authority 
and its directives was asserted; second, social forecasting was strictly subor-
dinated to the needs of economic planning.69 This was translated in practice 
in the following way: Future norms and values would be the prerogative of the 
party ideologues; thus, any normative forecasting would be subject to censor-
ship. Then, social forecasting's primary aim would be to harvest and feed 
social information needed to formulate performance indicators, enabling the 
increase in labor productivity and matching consumption needs. Explorative 
forecasting was allowed within certain limits, as it was recognized that the 
government should be aware of "really existing" social trends in Soviet soci-
ety, diverging from ideologically approved values.70 In line with this, social 
forecasting's research agenda was placed under the umbrella of the studies of 
the scientific-technical revolution and scientific-technical progress (STP). The 
66. In the summer of 1968, IKSI was established as a separate institute, based on the 
Department of Social Research (est. February 1966) at the Institute of Philosophy. ARAN, 
f. 1977, op. 1, d. 2,11.1-2. See Elizabeth A. Weinberg, Sociology in the Soviet Union and 
Beyond: Social Enquiry and Social Change (Aldershot, 2004). 
67. "Sotsial'nyi progress v SSSR" (1973), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 2, d. 66,1. 52. 
68. IKSI's research plan (1969), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 7,1.3. 
69. RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869,1. 47. 
70. Ibid., 1.77. The reports were sent to Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and 
Technology (GKNT), and the Foreign Ministry. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 40,1. 4. 
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announcement of the STR, in 1956, was followed by Khrushchev's declaration 
that the Soviet Union would catch up to and surpass the United States, fore-
seeing the building of communism in two decades.71 The STR and STP were 
recognized as the only legitimate drivers of societal change in addition to the 
political guidance of the party. As the STR and STP both influenced society 
and depended on the existing social order, social forecasting studies were to 
measure the implications of these two aspects. Such studies promised a re-
freshing complexity and the capacity to formulate research questions beyond 
Marxism-Leninism. Yet in practice, social forecasting was to a large extent 
limited to simple statistical studies of the changing structure of labor markets, 
related education patterns, leisure, and social needs. 
To fend off ideological attacks, Soviet sociologists preferred quantitative 
methods of social forecasting; after all, even Stalin mocked those who claimed 
that mathematics was also political. Yet it was the subordination to economic 
planning, entailing a constant demand for social statistics, that provided the 
institutional rationale for organizing social forecasting as a subdiscipline of 
sociology. All this, alas, proved to be insufficient to elevate social forecasting 
to a priority science on a par with cybernetics and systems analysis. At IKSI, 
this soon became evident. Large in terms of staff, it was as underequipped as 
the NOT institute in the 1920s: Soviet sociologists lacked enough calculators 
to work out the effects of the STR.72 Just like NOT, IKSI would be shaken by 
severe, although not as violent, political turbulence soon after its establish-
ment.73 I will now detail how social forecasting sailed through the political 
turbulences at IKSI, its sails ripped and flopping in the end. 
The existing historiography of Soviet social forecasting revolves much 
around the personality of Igor' Bestuzhev-Lada, one of the few who attempted 
to institutionalize future studies as a separate discipline in the Soviet Union, 
but he is also named as the pioneer of world futures studies.74 Born in 1927 
71. Osier, Rethinking the Scientific Revolution. 
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into a peasant family in a small Mordovian village called Lada (hence his 
pen name), about 500 km from Moscow, Bestuzhev-Lada began his academic 
career as a military historian of the Crimean War in the 1950s. As a young 
historian, he sought directly to influence governmental policies. For instance, 
in 1951, Bestuzhev-Lada sent a letter to Stalin suggesting taking away by force 
those children who were inappropriately reared by their parents in order to 
educate them as communist citizens in orphanages. Retrospectively, he attri-
butes high significance to this correspondence as an expression of his desire 
to be useful and serve the central power organs.75 This striving will mark his 
later attempts to shape the nascent field of Soviet future studies. 
In his many writings, Bestuzhev-Lada explicitly acknowledges his ambi-
tion to become a pioneer of, and then a dominant figure in, future studies in 
Soviet Russia. In his memoir, he recalls wishing to write a science-fiction story 
on moral communist citizenship. Having consulted the library catalogue sec-
tion on "Utopian socialism," he found H. G. Wells's Anticipations of the Reaction 
of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought (1901) and 
K. E. Tsiolkovskii's "The Future of Earth and Mankind" (1928). These works, 
claimed Bestuzhev-Lada, gave him the idea that the future could be studied 
scientifically in the same way as the past. He even insisted on having coined 
the term futurology in 1956, completely independently of Flechtheim.76 It is, 
however, uncertain if he was such a pioneer: Bestuzhev-Lada's first publica-
tions in the future studies field appeared in 1967; hence, they postdated both 
Dobrov's work in technology assessment and Kosygin's call for forecasting.77 
Bestuzhev-Lada's career moves clearly illustrate his striving for adminis-
trative and academic power. In the summer of 1966, Edvard Arab-Ogly, a for-
mer editor of Voprosy filosofii and Problemy mira i sotsializma (World Marxist 
Review), then the head of the Department of Concrete Social Research at the 
Institute of International Labor Movement (IMRD), offered Bestuzhev-Lada a 
position as head of a unit (sektor) for forecasting the socioeconomic conse-
quences of the STR.78 In the mid-1960s, IMRD provided a pocket of relative 
liberty for highly heterogeneous scholarship, united by its search for ways to 
bypass communist dogma, and Arab-Ogly was personally interested in fore-
casting, especially in the field of demography.79 
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To get this higher administrative position, Bestuzhev-Lada was ready to 
sacrifice his academic prestige: at that time, IMRD belonged to the trade union 
sphere (it became an academy institute only later) and had a lower status than 
the Institute of History.80 Nevertheless, for Bestuzhev-Lada to head a unit was 
a step toward establishing himself as the main authority in the field of Soviet 
forecasting, and he was not keen on competitors. One of my informants sug-
gested that Bestuzhev-Lada prevented the publication of a book on approaches 
to prediction authored by several colleagues at IMRD, including Merab Ma-
mardashvili, Aleksandr Zinov'ev, and Oleg Genisaretskii.81 Bestuzhev-Lada's 
ambitions were high, and he dreamt about creating a scientific council for 
forecasting at the Academy of Sciences.82 Therefore, when academician Alek-
sei Rumiantsev invited Bestuzhev-Lada to join the newly established IKSI as 
head of a department {otdel) two years later with the promise of a staff of about 
seventy, he immediately agreed (and cunningly planned to maintain control 
of his IMRD unit as a vice chairman).83 
In February 1969, Bestuzhev-Lada joined IKSI, only to find that things did 
not work out as expected. He did not get to chair the promised department 
with seventy staff members but only a unit with four or five. There was no 
office space either: in the beginning, the unit held meetings in an apartment 
in the naukograd (science town) Dubna, outside Moscow. Then, it turned out 
that Bestuzhev-Lada had to share his research agenda with another influen-
tial scholar, Anatolii Zvorykin, the head of a unit for studies of the STR's social 
consequences, who collaborated closely with several international research 
programs at UNESCO. IKSI research was increasingly subordinated to the 
needs of Gosplan, which meant more fiddling with statistics and indicators 
than Bestuzhev-Lada was intellectually and personally prepared to accept.84 
In contrast, Zvorykin seemed to be both more comfortable with the function-
alist view of the STR and much better equipped to conduct statistical trend 
surveys (albeit simple ones).85 
It is therefore not surprising that Bestuzhev-Lada was more active not as 
a researcher but an organizer, seeking to both consolidate Soviet forecasting 
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85. This is suggested by the speed with which Zvorykin completed his research proj-
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as an autonomous field and establish links with western future studies.86 His 
international contacts dated back to the IMRD stage. In 1967, Robert Jungk 
and Fritz Baade, prominent institutional entrepreneurs of future studies who 
would later be involved in Soviet energy forecasts, visited Moscow and met 
Bestuzhev-Lada at the apartment of Ivan Efremov, a scientist and author of 
the famous novel The Andromeda Nebula (1957), which describes a global 
communist society several thousand years in the future.87 At this meeting, the 
idea of the World Future Studies Federation was discussed. Inspired by this 
conversation and seeing a window of opportunity, Bestuzhev-Lada initiated 
a forecasting section at the Soviet Sociology Association, an initiative that, 
reportedly, was not welcomed by all members of the board.88 Nevertheless, 
Bestuzhev-Lada was included in the Soviet delegations to the World Futures 
Conference in Oslo (1967) and Tokyo (1970), but he could not go: according to 
archival documents, for bureaucratic reasons the Soviet delegation was late 
and did not participate.89 In 1969, on the invitation of Johan Galtung, a pro-
Soviet thinker and the founder of peace and conflict studies and, indeed, the 
World Future Studies Federation, Bestuzhev-Lada visited the Peace Research 
Institute Oslo.90 Further international contacts were developed through the 
International Sociology Association (ISA), which united leftist sociologists 
and was supported by UNESCO. Bestuzhev-Lada was first elected as the head 
of the STR section of the seventh ISA Congress of Sociology, held in Varna in 
1970, and later as a vice chairman, alongside the prominent French futurist 
Bertrand de Jouvenel, of ISA's committee for future studies, and was included 
as a founding member of the World Future Studies Federation (established in 
1973). He later described the year 1970 as the high point in his international 
career, and indeed Bestuzhev-Lada established himself as a gatekeeper for 
Soviet-western interaction on social forecasting.91 Furthermore, unlike some 
of his colleagues, he emerged unscathed from the political overhaul of IKSI 
in 1970-71. Bestuzhev-Lada got entangled in this process because he partici-
pated in the unsanctioned Society for Scientific Forecasting. 
The story of the Society for Scientific Forecasting (SSF) is hazy. Facts are 
86. In 1969, Bestuzhev-Lada spoke at a number of the academy institutes and deliv-
ered a course on the history of forecasting at the philosophy department of Moscow State 
University. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 7,1.86. 
87. Due to the lack of space, the connections between scientific forecasting and sci-
ence-fiction writing cannot be addressed in this article; the subject, indeed, merits a study 
of its own. I will only note that Efremov's biographers appear to have overlooked his in-
ternational connections with western futurologists, something that might have explained 
the KGB's suspicion of Efremov after his death. 01 'ga Eremina and Nikolai Smirnov, Ivan 
Efremov (Moscow, 2013). 
88. The Soviet Sociological Association was established in June 1958. Dmitri N. Sha-
lin, "The Development of Soviet Sociology, 1956-1976," Annual Review of Sociology 4 
(1978): 171-91; Bestuzhev-Lada, "Prognozirovanie," 406, 414-15. 
89. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 2, d. 60. 
90. Bestuzhev-Lada was instructed to strictly focus on the perspectives of the socio-
economic aspects of disarmament in his Oslo talk. IKSI (September 1970) ARAN, f. 1977, 
op. 1, d. 52,11. 70-72; "Direktivnye ukazaniia" (IMRD, October 30,1968), ARAN, f. 1957, 
op. 1, d. 39,1.38.1 could not locate his report on this visit; Rocca indicated that Bestuzhev-
Lada indeed went in person to Oslo. 
91. Bestuzhev-Lada, "Prognozirovanie," 420. 
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scarce and can only be drawn from conflicting personal memoirs and the few 
archival documents, which are essentially accusations and therefore very 
likely heavily biased.92 Established in 1968, but never formally registered, the 
society stemmed from a Committee for All-Union Symposia in Scientific Fore-
casting (established in February 1967) at the Soviet Sociology Association and 
chaired by Bestuzhev-Lada.93 Although it was supported by the top leaders of 
the Academy of Sciences and included members of Gosplan, apparently no 
formal permission from the Central Committee was sought. It has to be added 
that such informal arrangements were not unusual: even large construction 
projects were begun without formal permissions in the Soviet Union.94 
The society was headed by the academician Vasilii Parin, a prominent 
biophysicist who specialized in space research and conducted several stud-
ies about future medical developments.95 In the documents, Bestuzhev-Lada 
is named as co-organizer of SSF, although he denied having this role and, in 
line with the prosecutors of SSF, claimed that this organization was used as 
a vehicle for extending the personal influence of the engineer B. N. Tardov of 
the Research Institute of the Metallurgical Ministry.96 In 1969, Tardov, act-
ing as vice president, attempted to formally register SSF as a public all-union 
organization, governed by an assembly and assuming academic activities, 
such as conferring academic degrees. In 1970, SSF planned to organize 1,600 
events involving 200,000 participants. The problem with SSF, it seems, was 
not so much the content but the form and scale of its activities: SSF emerged 
from the bottom up and organized its activities horizontally across the indus-
trial branches and academic institutes. 
In June 1971, an investigation was started and the outcomes were severe, 
although not for everyone. Consumed with anxiety, Parin had a stroke and 
died before he could be summoned for questioning. Tardov was repressed and 
moved to Latvia.97 In contrast, Bestuzhev-Lada made an informal agreement 
92. In the 1980s, Rocca painstakingly tried to map the development of the SSF but 
with little success. Some information about it can be found in Firsov, Istoriia sovetskoi 
sotsiologii. The current state of knowledge leaves one with a lot of unanswered questions 
about this initiative. 
93. In his autobiography, Bestuzhev-Lada claims that the basis for the spontaneous 
prognosis conferences and, eventually, the association was his seminar at IMRD in 1967. 
In May 1968, this committee organized the Public Institute for Social Prognosis, with 
Bestuzhev-Lada named as director, although he denied that he was appointed to this po-
sition. Bestuzhev-Lada was in charge of the organizing of the second congress in scientific 
prognosis, and Tardov took over when organizing the third congress. Bestuzhev-Lada, 
"Prognozirovanie," 421-22; Bestuzhev-Lada, Svozhu schety. 
94. See, for example, Egle Rindzeviciute, "When Formal Organisations Meet Informal 
Relations in Soviet Lithuania: Action Nets, Networks and Boundary Objects in the Con-
struction of the Lithuanian Sea Museum," Lithuanian Historical Studies 15 (2011): 107-34. 
95. Vasilii Parin, "Nauchnye trudy za 1935-71," ARAN, f. 1640, op. 1. 
96. One document noted that Dobrov and Bestuzhev-Lada refused to join this initia-
tive to reform the committee into an association. "Zapiska otdela nauki i otdela propa-
gandy TsK KPSS o grubykh narusheniiakh ustanovlennogo poriadka pri sozdanii vse-
soiuznogo obshchestva nauchnogo prognozirovaniia (October 21,1970)," in Batygin and 
Iarmoliuk, eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia, 528-30. 
97. "Dopol'nenie k zapiske o grubykh narusheniiakh ustanovlennogo poriadka pri 
sozdanii vsesoiuznogo obshchestva nauchnogo prognozirovaniia (March 5, 1971)," in 
Batygin and Iarmoliuk, eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia, 536-40; Firsov, Istoriia sovetskoi 
sotsiologii, 31. 
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with prosecutors to serve as scapegoat; in his words, they needed to punish 
someone with a PhD, and therefore he was given a reprimand (vygovor). To 
say that he got off lightly is an understatement: Bestuzhev-Lada writes in his 
memoir that by way of compensation, he received two holiday trips abroad 
and was then instructed to suspend his academic activities for one year, dur-
ing which time he mainly stayed in his summer house. Bestuzhev-Lada kept 
his position as a unit head at IKSI (renamed the ISI in 1972). In June 1972, he 
was back at work, included in a group providing expertise for the complex na-
tional program of social development.98 In September 1972, Bestuzhev-Lada 
traveled to Bucharest to participate in the third Future Studies Conference, 
organized with the personal support of Nicolae Ceausescu." Following this 
conference, the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences decided not to 
formally support the organization of the World Future Studies Federation but 
instead to consider Soviet participation in future meetings on a case-by-case 
basis.100 This allowed Bestuzhev-Lada to attend the WFSF meetings but with-
out the formal status of Soviet participation, although he was named as a 
founding member. 
How are we to understand this turmoil? Was it an attack on the postposi-
tivist method, with its potential for producing undesirable Soviet futures? It 
is difficult to say, because SSF had not yet produced any distinctive empirical 
forecasts. Although the purge of SSF coincided with purges at IKSI, it is un-
clear if they were directly related.101 It is likely that these attacks were of a per-
sonal nature, using ideology as a rhetorical tool to legitimize decisions.102 In 
spring 1972, Rumiantsev was dismissed from his high position and replaced 
by Mikhail Rutkevich, a hardline communist but also a promoter of sociol-
ogy at Ural State University.103 Some prominent sociologists, such as Levada 
and Grushin, who specialized in public opinion surveys, were transferred 
to TsEMI. Some IKSI employees found shelter under Gvishiani at the GKNT 
Institute of Management Problems and, after 1976, the Institute for Systems 
Research (VNIISI). Social forecasting was retained as a unit at the reorga-
nized ISI, and in 1972 a commission for forecasting was organized under the 
All-Union Council of Scientific Societies, which mainly engaged in retraining 
academics.104 
98. Bestuzhev-Lada, "Prognozirovanie," 422-23; "Prikaz no. 14-104" (Moscow, 
June 23,1972), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 59,11.17-18. In July, Bestuzhev-Lada was appointed 
as the head of the unit for methodological problems of forecasting social needs. 
99. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 2, d. 60. 
100. This was a great achievement, because the influential philosopher and acade-
mician Bonifatii M. Kedrov spoke vehemently against participating in such conferences. 
ARAN, f. 1731, op. 1, d. 160,11.127-36. Another issue was that at the Bucharest conference, 
the famous western futurologist Robert Jungk pressured the Soviet Union to permit Jewish 
scientists to emigrate. 
101. The common denominator for these purges is probably the attack on Rumiantsev. 
For instance, a letter to the Central Committee which listed the ideological errors com-
mitted at IKSI did not mention either Bestuzhev-Lada or forecasting. "Zapiska TsK KPSS 
o rabote IKSI AN SSSR," TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 20, d. 770,11. 41-42, in Batygin and larmoliuk, 
eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia, 551-53. 
102. Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton, 1996). 
103. ARAN, f. 2, op. 6m, d. 500,11.180-81. 
104. From 1975, the commission organized annual conferences and summer schools 
in forecasting. Rabochaia kniga po prognozirovaniiu (Moscow, 1982), 69. 
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Unlike the NIEI economists, Bestuzhev-Lada hardly ever expressed con-
cern with the issue of glasnost and data flow. He did, however, insist on social 
forecasters' central role in government. Back in the late 1960s, Bestuzhev-
Lada contacted several aides of Politburo members and suggested the estab-
lishment of a secret commission for social forecasting dedicated to analyzing 
the social consequences of political decisions made by the Politburo. The idea 
was that this secret commission would work in partnership with the military-
industrial complex and reinforce his authority at the Academy of Sciences.105 
If Bestuzhev-Lada was keen to help the security apparatus control society, 
what kind of society did his future methods invoke? 
Soviet Future Society Forecasted 
Bestuzhev-Lada's early work shared many visions with Efremov's Andromeda 
Nebula—first of all, a global orientation and a belief in inexhaustible re-
sources. His turn from historical research to current affairs was documented 
in the book Esli mir razoruzhitsia... (If the World Disarms..., 1961), written 
as a propaganda commentary on peace talks between Nikita Khruschev and 
John F. Kennedy in Vienna. Outlining several alternatives for societal devel-
opment that could be boosted by redirecting armament expenditures, If the 
World Disarms engaged with themes that were becoming central in future 
studies: the consequences of nuclear war and possible societal and industrial 
futures. Bestuzhev-Lada described the progress achieved by transforming 
natural systems without any regard to possible ecological consequences.106 
He listed megaprojects for industrializing the north, such as constructing 
"new Leningrads" and "new Stockholms" by removing permafrost, warming 
up the Northern Ocean, and redirecting the Gulf Stream to create a "British 
climate" in the Far East.107 Welcoming future population growth, Bestuzhev-
Lada found it "unacceptable" that such a large surface area of the Earth is oc-
cupied by the ocean. This major restructuring of the natural world could start, 
for example, with draining the Mediterranean Sea and creating picturesque 
islands, a process that "would not be costly at all."108 
These remarkable Stalinist visions disappeared from Bestuzhev-Lada's 
writings in the 1970s-80s. In retrospect, he explained his initiative to estab-
lish a secret commission at the Politburo as an attempt to return to this kind of 
thinking, and, indeed, he did return to it after 1990. During the IKSI overhaul, 
Bestuzhev-Lada probably learned the lesson that it was safest to say nothing 
of substance. Visionary content was now replaced with a dry discussion of 
105. In his interview, Bestuzhev-Lada mentions regular meetings with Politburo 
members' assistants in 1967-69; he wrote, "In my thoughts, I was far away from IKSI and 
close to the Politburo." Bestuzhev-Lada, "Prognozirovanie," 420. 
106. On the high modernist plans for large-scale industrialization, which had cata-
strophic effects on the natural environment, see Paul R. Josephson, Industrialized Na-
ture: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World (Washington, 
D.C., 2002). 
107. Igor' V. Lada, Esli mir razoruzhitsia... (Moscow, 1961), 6,18, 43-44. 
108. Lada, Esli mir, 63. Bestuzhev-Lada co-authored with Oleg Pisarzhevskii a revised 
version of this book, titled Kontury griadushchego (The Contours of the Future, 1965). 
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methodology that signaled the need to embed scientific forecasters structur-
ally in the top decision-making processes. Even Okno v budushchee: Sovre-
mennyeproblemy sotsial'nogoprognozirovaniia (A Window to the Future: The 
Contemporary Problems of Social Prognosis, 1970), which Bestuzhev-Lada 
described as the key work done at IMRD, was a superficial introduction to 
western future studies containing no Soviet data.109 His main interest was in 
the development of expert surveys, a version of the Delphi method in which a 
group of anonymous experts are asked to assess the likelihood of future de-
velopments. Their answers are statistically aggregated and circulated within 
the group, and they then revise their opinions based on this aggregated data. 
While this technique was clearly problematic—it was unlikely that a Soviet 
expert would trust a promise of anonymity—it is important to note that here 
the medium became the message: Bestuzhev-Lada's version of the Soviet fu-
ture was an intellectual infrastructure, a skeleton of governmental control 
mechanisms, with forecasters situated close to the signal-issuing center. 
Bestuzhev-Lada's studies did not foresee change in Soviet society's future. 
One telling example can be invoked here. From 1972, Bestuzhev-Lada's unit 
developed social indicators and forecasted young people's future needs.110 
A transcript of an internal discussion reveals that Bestuzhev-Lada built his 
analysis on the assumption that "people in the 1990s will behave in the same 
way as today," resulting in a shallow and conservative study. His colleagues 
disagreed: Shlapentokh suggested that should the environment that satisfied 
their needs disappear, the needs would disappear too; Lisichkin pointed to the 
forecasts predicting about 85 percent more new goods in France in 1985 and 
thus, quite possibly, different needs among young people.111 Bestuzhev-Lada, 
however, remained unwilling to use forecasting to reveal the unexpected. His 
caution to avoid uncovering any new issues is well illustrated by the choice to 
copy and paste pages and pages on societal problems and future directions 
from the party programs in his books.112 Even in the late 1980s, when social 
value studies were extended to include studies of deviation, such as alcohol 
and drugs problems, Soviet social forecasting never articulated disruptive so-
cial change. Putting a premium on trends and continuity, social forecasting 
served as a tool for conserving the status quo. 
The changes that finally took place were rooted instead in other academic 
milieus, closer to the heart of economic planning: TsEMI and VNIISI. The 
names of the participants in the 1966 debate on forecasting surfaced after 
1986, most prominently Aganbegian, who became Mikhail Gorbachev's eco-
nomic advisor. Yet the link between perestroika and the 1960s is found in 
the 1970s, when economic and technoscientific forecasting became solidly 
established as an area of east-west cooperation. Equipped with western com-
puters, VNIISI made alternative long-term forecasts and submitted them to 
109. This and other books authored by Bestuzhev-Lada were outcomes of the work of 
his whole research group at IKSI, with sometimes dozens of contributions. 
110. IKSI (March 3,1972), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 61,1.11. 
111. IKSI protocols (February 6, 1973, March 6-15, 1973), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, 
d. 91,11. 6-9. 
112. See I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada and S. F. Frolov, Poiskovoe sotsial'noeprognozirovanie: 
Perspektivnye problem obshchestva. Opyt sistematizatsii (Moscow, 1984), 81-84. 
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the Politburo.113 Then, economists succeeded in institutionalizing forecasting 
where Bestuzhev-Lada could not, although this took two decades: in 1986, 
the Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Technoscientific Progress was 
formed from several departments at TsEMI on the initiative of Aleksandr An-
chishkin, Iurii Iaremenko, and Stanislav Shatalin. From the late 1970s, Soviet 
environmental scientists and economists began applying their forecasts to 
model substantially different, alternative Soviet futures. It was none other 
than Shatalin, in his capacity as economic advisor to Gorbachev, who master-
minded combining the expertise of eastern European and western planners 
to design the restructuring of state socialist economies, the program for which 
was developed in 1989 and situated at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, in Austria, an institute created under the patronage of Ko-
sygin and Gvishiani.114 
The outcomes, as we now know, exceeded all expectations. One should 
not, however, resort to the trivial observation of forecasters' failure to predict 
the collapse of the Soviet Union: rather, this is a perfect demonstration that 
forecasting is not about foretelling but about forging of a new future. 
The search for new intellectual models of governance was a strong feature of 
de-Stalinization. This article demonstrates that scientific forecasting was an 
example of such innovation, introduced to rejuvenate the existing practices of 
Soviet economic planning. The key task of forecasting—to contextualize cur-
rent and often ad hoc decisions by showing their long-term consequences-
was potent with critique. Yet the critical role of Soviet forecasting cannot be 
understood through a reductionist binary opposition between party control 
and resistance: even as a tool to implement party directives, forecasting had 
subversive effects.115 To be sure, as Frederic Jameson famously noted, images 
of the future have long been invoked by critics of the present.116 But some 
Soviet forecasting contributed not so much with ready-made images but with 
a special methodology that clashed strongly with the bureaucratic logic of 
Soviet planning. Instead of challenging the political dogmas of the command 
economy and the superiority of state socialism, scientific forecasting incre-
mentally modified the very essence of governance by suggesting that the 
uncertain outcomes of any policies could never be avoided, thus paving the 
road for a particular, Soviet version of what Michael Power describes as risk 
management.117 
Paul Gregory has argued that with the exception of short, quarterly plans, 
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the exuberant Soviet planning system had little impact on actual perfor-
mance.118 My analysis calls Gregory's view into question, suggesting that the 
impact of long-term planning based on scientific forecasting should not be 
reduced to economic performance but can also be found in changing under-
standings of what it means to govern. As revealed in the 1966 NIEI debate, 
leading Soviet economists expected that forecasting's methodological imper-
atives would enable them to overcome the fragmentation of Soviet planning 
into branches. Their aims matched those of high politics: the Soviet govern-
ment, concerned with maintaining its image as a superpower, could not afford 
to lag behind in the development of predictive policy sciences. In practice, 
this ambition was reined in by both the lack and the strict control of data.119 
Just like the interwar time managers who were not provided with timers to test 
their models, the forecasters at the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
lacked access to computers and, in fact, to the data needed for forecasting. 
This lack of data was acknowledged only in internal reports: regardless 
of the propaganda of technoscientific progress that was to propel the Soviet 
Union into the foremost ranks of advanced countries, the Gosplan statisti-
cians complained that "statistical data on technoscientific progress in the 
Soviet Union is collected absolutely inadequately."120 In a discussion at the 
Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1983, the economist Shatalin 
stated that although TsEMI employed a thousand staff, it had not managed to 
construct an optimal plan for the Soviet economy during its two decades of 
existence; in turn, even the twenty thousand staff members of the Gosplan 
system never produced a well-balanced plan.121 
For my argument, it is centrally important that this gap was noticed and 
criticized. This criticism hinted that new governmental norms that enabled 
observers to view actual Soviet practices as structurally defective were in 
place. The future of the Soviet economy was constructed as more open, prob-
abilistic, and even uncertain, particularly regarding intensifying extraction 
of gas and oil resources, which, it became clear in the 1970s, would eventu-
ally be exhausted.122 In contrast, it appears to have been much more difficult 
to use social forecasting to articulate different futures for Soviet society, al-
though this difficulty might have been due to personal as much as ideological 
politics.123 
Soviet forecasting contributed to the development of a belief that gover-
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nance without reliable information was condemned to fail. The present state 
of any sector could not be interpreted without reference to the future, and the 
future could not be known without data about the past. Soviet forecasters 
made this vicious loop explicit in the 1960s, calling for better visibility and 
accountability and paving the way for glasnost and the policies that opened 
up Soviet society for a more free flow of information. Although forecasters 
remained a minority, their field's very existence points to the heterogeneity of 
the Soviet governmental landscape that did contain resources for democratic 
change and where scientific forecasting laid the foundation for a less authori-
tarian future. 
